在巴菲特看來，公司治理的核心很簡單：管理層必須對股東負責，董事會則必須在必要時真正發揮監督作用。很多形式上的獨立性、委員會安排與程序設計，若無法落實到這個目標，就很容易流於表面。

公司治理（Corporate Governance）

定義與起源

巴菲特長期批評，美國大型企業的董事會常見的問題不是規則太少，而是董事不願意對執行長提出真正困難的問題。當董事缺乏商業判斷、投入程度不足，或利益和股東不一致時，治理再漂亮也可能失效。

核心要義

第一，董事會失能往往來自氣氛與激勵結構，而不是法條文字。

「在一個充滿彬彬有禮之人的董事會中，要開口質疑執行長是否應該換人，幾乎是不可能的。最後，當薪酬委員會——一如既往地有高薪顧問撐腰——提報給予執行長鉅額選擇權時，若有董事建議委員會重新考慮，那就像是在餐桌上打嗝一般失禮。」

"In a boardroom populated by "congenial" people... the disrupter will be looked upon as a nuisance. It is extremely difficult for a director to be the lone voice that questions the CEO's pay or performance. The result is that boards too often fail their obligations."

— 2002 年致股東信

「四十年來，我擔任過 19 家上市公司的董事，與大約 250 位董事有過互動……這些董事中的絕大多數，至少缺乏我所重視的三項素質中的一項——商業洞見、對工作保持投入，以及以股東利益為導向。」

"Over the last 40 years, I've served on 19 public-company boards, and have seen my share of corporate governance problems. Too often directors are drawn from a restricted pool of candidates and may lack the knowledge, interest, or independence needed to represent shareholders well."

— 2002 年致股東信

第二，所謂『獨立董事』未必真的獨立。 如果董事的重要收入來自董事酬勞或其他關係，自然很難完全站在股東一邊。

「以聖經的標準衡量，最不獨立的董事，很可能是那些從董事服務費中獲取年收入重要比例的人——他們同時也希望被推薦進入其他董事會，從而進一步提高收入。然而，這些人恰恰是最常被歸類為『獨立』董事的那群人。」

"By the biblical standard, the least independent director is likely one who has a large portion of his annual income coming from his director's fees – and who also hopes to be recommended for other boards. Such a director, though technically 'independent,' will often have his independence measured not by the company's performance but by his ability to please the CEO."

— 2004 年致股東信

第三，高階主管薪酬是治理品質的重要試金石。

「1890 年代，Samuel Gompers 將有組織勞工的目標定義為『要更多！』1990 年代，美國的執行長們採納了這個戰鬥口號。結果是：執行長們往往在股東蒙受財務災難之際，卻坐擁大量財富。」

"In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers described the goal of organized labor as 'More!' In the 1990s, America's CEOs adopted his battle cry. The upshot is that CEOs have often amassed riches while their shareholders have experienced financial disasters. Directors should stop such piracy."

— 2002 年致股東信

「薪酬委員會往往像搖尾巴的小狗，乖乖聽從顧問的建議——這個群體向來不以忠於那些默默支付費用、面目模糊的股東著稱。（如果你看不出某人站在誰那邊，那他就不是站在你這邊。）」

"Compensation committees have too often been tail-wagging poodles of the CEO rather than Dobermans biting at management's heels. As a result, compensation packages have become increasingly bloated. If you can't tell whose side someone is on, they're not on your side."

— 2002 年致股東信

第四，治理最終還是要落到利益一致。 巴菲特偏好董事自己真金白銀持股，並讓報酬設計對應真實經營成果。

「以聖經的標準衡量，波克夏的董事會堪稱楷模：（a）每位董事都是家族成員，其家族持有的股票價值至少達 400 萬美元；（b）這些股份沒有任何一股是透過期權或贈予的方式從波克夏取得；（c）沒有任何董事從公司收取委員會費、顧問費或董事費；（d）雖然我們設有標準的公司賠償安排，但我們並未為董事購買責任保險。在波克夏，董事會成員與股東走在同一條路上。」

"Measured by the biblical standard, the Berkshire board is a model: (a) every director is a member of a family owning at least $4 million of stock; (b) none of these shares were acquired from Berkshire via options or grants; (c) no directors receive committee, consulting or board fees from the company that are more than a tiny portion of their annual income; and (d) although we have a standard corporate indemnity arrangement, we carry no liability insurance for directors. At Berkshire, board members travel the same road as shareholders."

— 2004 年致股東信

思想演變

早期批評

巴菲特在 1990 年代以前就已經開始質疑董事會的實際作用。他特別關注的是：董事是否真的會在執行長失職時出手，以及是否能抵抗過度薪酬的慣性。

「如果選擇權不是薪酬的一種形式，它們是什麼？如果薪酬不是費用，那是什麼？如果費用不應該進入盈餘計算，它們應該去哪裡？」

"If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?"

— 1998 年致股東信

所羅門事件

所羅門事件讓巴菲特親身體會到，治理失敗往往不只來自個人失誤，也來自董事會與高層在關鍵時刻沒有及時糾偏。

「去年六月，在擔任所羅門公司臨時董事長十個月後，我辭職了。若沒有所羅門高管聯合努力，公司很可能就不會存活下來。」

"Last June, I resigned as Interim Chairman of Salomon after ten months in that post. Without the dedicated and brilliant efforts of Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don Howard and John Macfarlane, the firm very likely would not have survived."

— 1992 年致股東信

接班與延續

到了近年，巴菲特把公司治理的重要職責進一步聚焦在接班安排與文化延續上。

「董事會最重要的職責，是確保適當的人選掌管業務，並確認下一代領導人已就位、隨時可接棒。」

"The most important job of the board is to see that the right CEO is in place and to be ready when the moment comes to replace him or her if that is not the case. The next most important job is to make sure that the CEO is not overpaid."

— 2011 年致股東信

典型案例

薪酬委員會失靈。 巴菲特多次指出，美國企業常透過薪酬顧問與同業比較，把高管薪酬一再往上推。

所羅門公司。 高層對重大違規延遲揭露，顯示即使企業有正式治理架構，若缺乏真正負責的董事與高層，危機仍可能失控。

波克夏的治理模式。 董事與股東利益高度一致、不依賴選擇權激勵、總部官僚層級低，這些安排共同支持其治理哲學。

巴菲特原話精選

「理論上，企業董事會應該遏止行為的墮落。為何聰明正派的董事會敗得如此徹底？答案不在於法律不夠完善，而在於我所謂的『董事會氛圍』。」

"The acid test of reform will be CEO compensation. Management will cheerfully agree to "independent" directors, certifications of various sorts, and other governance palliatives. But many will fight strenuously against a genuine examination of their own pay."

— 2002 年致股東信

「改革的試金石將是執行長薪酬問題。許多人會極力抵制的，是對其自身薪酬與福利的嚴格審視。」

"The acid test of reform will be CEO compensation. Management will cheerfully agree to board changes, certifications and the like – but many will resist hard examination of their own pay."

— 2002 年致股東信

「在波克夏，我是獨任的薪酬委員會，一人決定約 40 家重要營運企業執行長的薪資與激勵方案。這項工作占用我多少時間？幾乎是零。在我們 42 年的歷史中，有多少執行長自願離開我們去別處高就？正好也是零。」

"At Berkshire, I am the one-person compensation committee. I set the salaries and incentive arrangements for the CEOs of our 40-plus significant operating businesses. How much time does this take? Almost none. And how many of our CEOs have voluntarily left us in our 42-year history to take a better job elsewhere? Exactly zero."

— 2006 年致股東信

「如果你開始愚弄你的股東，你很快就會相信自己的胡言亂語，並開始愚弄自己。」

"If you begin to fool your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and start fooling yourself."

— 2024 年致股東信

公司治理